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DOI: https://doi.org/10.34069/AI/2022.57.08.18
How to Cite:
Vergara-Romero, A., Rojas-Dávila, M., & Olalla-Hernández, A. (2022). Does Money Help Elections? Analysis of the Impact of
Campaign Spending and Incumbency in Ecuador. Amazonia Investiga, 11(57), 172-180. https://doi.org/10.34069/AI/2022.57.08.18
Does Money Help Elections? Analysis of the Impact of Campaign
Spending and Incumbency in Ecuador
¿El Dinero ayuda a las Elecciones? Análisis del Impacto del Gasto de Campaña y la
Incumbencia en Ecuador
Received: October 10, 2022 Accepted: November 5, 2022
Written by:
Arnaldo Vergara-Romero58
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8503-3685
Muman Rojas-Dávila59
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6173-8349
Alex Olalla-Hernández60
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7305-4750
Abstract
Restricting policies on electoral spending are
intended to equalize the conditions of
participation of candidates for a seat in a popular
election. However, does the application of these
restrictions generate equity in the electoral
contest, or the opposite? There is much evidence
about the advantage of the candidate who is
reelected (incumbent) against his contender
(challenger), which questions whether the budget
restriction on electoral spending is effective in
itself. For this research, we used a multiple linear
regression method that measures the effects of
the effectiveness of campaign spending in
attracting votes from candidates for mayor of
Ecuador, resulting in incumbency providing a
degree of advantage over challengers. much
more than the efficiency of spending, all in a
highly restrictive scenario in electoral budgets
and political campaign time.
Keywords: Electoral spending, electoral
budgets, incumbent, elections, mayors.
Introduction
There is plenty of evidence about the influence of
money in attracting votes. Despite it being a
preponderant factor, it is not the only reason a
candidate wins. There are many factors that can
be measurable or subjective, such as incumbency
and campaign spending. These variables have
become the parameters within which studies seek
58
Magister en Economía, Docente-Investigador de tiempo completo, Universidad Ecotec, Samborondón, Ecuador.
59
Magister en Matemática Avanzada y Profesional, Docente de posgrado, Universidad Ecotec, Samborondón, Ecuador.
60
Magister en Economía, Docente-Investigador tiempo completo, Universidad de Córdoba, Córdoba, España.
to learn the impact on attracting votes in an
election.
For Rivera (2012), the relationship between
money and politics in electoral contexts is of
greatest interest among political science studies,
with money being an important variable on
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electoral performance. At an academic level, this
topic is of growing interest (Stratmann, 2005) but
the volume of research that seeks to empirically
find out the effect of money on elections and
party systems has not received the expected
attention (Morales & Piñeiro, 2010).
Jacobson (1978), the initiator of this research,
proposes that campaign spending has a positive
influence on capturing votes in an election, and
incumbency is a determining factor of advantage
over a challenger (Abramowitz, 1991). His
detractors, Green & Krasno (1988) claim that
marginal spending favors the contender or
opponent much more than the incumbent. Also,
in a joint study, Jacobson and Kernell (1983)
measure the importance of strategy and the
experience of the candidates in the electoral
contest.
Research conducted on the election of candidates
for the US Congress has confirmed the advantage
that incumbents have over challengers, whose
only way to compete against incumbents is the
experience and funding they have (Holbrook &
Weinschenk, 2014). Several studies confirm this
premise in state legislative elections (Van Dunk,
1997; Abbe & Herrnson, 2003; Carey, Niemi, &
Powell, 2000), governor elections (King, 2001)
and municipal councilors (Gierzynski, Klepner
& Lewis, 1998); all this within the US electoral
system.
In other regions of the world, the interest in the
influence of money in electoral wins has led
authors such as Palda & Palda (1998) to review
the French elections, and arrive at the conclusion
that the challenger performs better than the
incumbent. Shin et al., (2005) infers that the
spending of the challengers captures more votes
in an election for congressmen in Korea. Similar
results were found in Japan (Cox & Thies, 2000)
and Portugal (Veiga & Goncalves, 2004).
Latin America offers very particular study
grounds; the local political bases built on two
populist tendencies (left and right) make for
comparative diversity where this type of research
can be applied. There is extensive literature in
Latin America analyzing the financing
mechanisms of parties and candidates, as well as
the need for the existence of public financing
regulations (Del Castillo & Zovatto, 1998).
"Because campaign finance has such enormous
potential policy and regulatory implications
everywhere, academics must begin to evaluate its
impact in a comparative perspective" (Samuels,
2001).
In Chile, studies on electoral spending and its
impact on electoral performance (Rivera, 2012;
Acevedo & Navia, 2015) showed that money is
relevant but not decisive to win an election. On
the other hand, in countries such as Argentina,
Mexico, and Ecuador, studies place public
spending as a factor in capturing more votes or
having influence (Nazareno, Stokes, & Brusco,
2006; Carrillo, 2006; Borja, 2020).
In this context, Ecuador offers an unexplored
political scenario to address the issue of the
impact of electoral spending on elections, due to
its spending restriction policies that contemplate
a minimum budget, in addition to a 45-day time
limit to campaign for any seat up for election, and
an open party system that does not limit the
number of contenders for a popular position.
This research aims to quantitatively evaluate the
capture of votes and electoral spending within a
restrictive policy of campaign spending in
Ecuador for a mayoral election, the inclusion of
efficiency as an independent variable understood
as the total percentage of spending on the limit of
each candidate and the effect of being a titular or
incumbent candidate in Ecuador for the 2014
mayoral elections.
The results are expected to show favorable
effects for the incumbent and a positive effect on
the efficiency of voting spending, showing that
the voting budget restriction only benefits certain
candidates in the Ecuadorian contest. Therefore,
this research will evaluate a policy whose
purpose is to create equality of conditions for
candidates within an electoral contest, and will
offer a way to technically understand the
effectiveness of campaign spending for
candidates.
Literature Review
The classic discussion on the impact of spending
and electoral success was initiated by Jacobson,
(1978) in his publication "The effects of
Campaign Spending in Congressional
Elections," where he justifies that the impact
electoral spending performance has on
incumbents is not significant since they have a
much higher position than any other candidate
over the electoral population. The political
production curve is unknown by the candidates,
says Alexander (1984); this focuses the efforts to
get votes only on the amount of spending that a
candidate can invest in his campaign, since they
empirically understand that success depends on
the investment and not on the returns from it.
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Campaign spending continues to be a
determining factor in attracting votes –the
incumbent and the challenger generate benefits
around this variable, but there are other factors
that intervene in electoral success since it heavily
depends on the financing that a candidate may
have, and if a spending limit exists, it would
serve to protect the incumbent in an effective
contest (Abramowitz, 1991).
Other authors criticize Jacobson's position (1978,
1987), demonstrating that the challenger can
match spending performance almost at similar
levels than the incumbent since there are other
characteristics to consider that benefit them in a
competition, such as the quality of the candidate
(Love, 2009); therefore, when an incumbent
competes with a rival with high popularity levels
and chances of winning, he tends to considerably
increase his campaign spending in such a way
that this variable is statistically significant in
electoral performance (Green & Krasno, 1988).
Despite the fact that studies regarding the impact
of spending on attracting votes have been carried
out in a limited time period (Erikson & Palfrey,
1998), such studies showed that spending has a
long-term beneficial effect on the incumbent on
a cumulative basis: an incumbent's campaigns
appear to see longer-lasting effects, which grants
benefits and an advantage in the electoral race
(Erikson & Palfrey, 1998).
Many studies on electoral spending performance
do not determine the causes related to attracting
votes, they only conclude its relevance. In
France, the return on spending is much higher in
challengers but incumbency continues to be an
important factor in attracting votes (Palda &
Palda, 1998). These authors propose the effect
that the spending restriction has on incumbents,
stating that if the campaign spending cap had
been cut in half in assembly elections,
incumbents would have gained a 10% advantage
over their closest challenger.
In his research on congressional elections in
Korea, Shin et al., (2005) shows that the
defendant's spending tends to increase the
amount of votes a candidate gets in his favor and
the incumbent's spending decreases the rival's
vote percentage. This study adds an interesting
factor to the analysis: the impact that the region
has when the leader of a candidate's party is a
native.
In Latin America, Samuels (2001) and Morales
& Piñeiro (2010), studied voting behavior in
Brazil and Chile respectively. In Brazil, both the
incumbent and the challenger benefitted from
campaign spending, despite the differences in
conditions (Morales Quiroga & Reveco Cabello,
2018), and electoral limits here encourage
competition between candidates. However, in
Chile, a democratic system with control of
electoral spending already benefiting the
incumbent, he sees a significant advantage in
attracting votes.
In Ecuador, a restrictive policy on electoral
spending should improve the participation of the
other candidates and the incumbent, as it equals
their campaign expenses (Macas-Acosta et al.
2022). This will be demonstrated in the model
made to determine if incumbency is an advantage
point in elections, and whether the return on
spending favors the incumbent or not.
Definitely, the discussion on the effectiveness of
electoral spending has several standpoints, the
only one in its favor is that spending is still a
highly relevant factor in attracting votes, but
there are also decisive factors that complement
spending and make a candidate's campaign in any
election much more effective.
The questions to answer in this investigation are
the following: Does the incumbent have an
advantage over the new mayoral candidates?
How much does investment influence the amount
of votes a candidate gets under a restrictive
electoral spending policy? Does spending
performance influence how many votes the
candidates get? Does a policy that limits electoral
spending improve the conditions for candidates
in an election?
Ecuadorian political context for the 2014
elections
Ecuador has been following a neoliberal model
of development since the late eighties (Ochoa-
Rico et al., 2022), set off during president Sixto
Duran Ballen's period (1992 - 1996). Many
authors agree that this is the moment
neoliberalism was consolidated in the country,
through fiscal adjustment "stabilization" policies,
deregulation of fuel prices, increases in public
service and oil product prices (Minteguiaga,
2012). Vice President Alberto Dahik resigned
from his position and fled the country after being
accused of misuse of reserved funds. In spite of
the crisis, President Durán Ballén completed his
term, which would become the last time an
Ecuadorian president completed his term until
2007.
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In 1996, populist president Abdalá Bucaram was
elected into office. He implemented currency
convertibility policies and overturned several
subsidies, which confronted the business
community and trade unionists. His policies lost
him popular and institutional legitimacy, which
gave the National Congress an excuse for his
removal. He subsequently fled the country, and
the president of Congress, Fabián Alarcón, came
into power in 1997, after a one-day legal dispute
with Vice President Rosalía Arteaga, whose term
was the shortest in the history of Ecuadorian
democracy.
In 1998, a time of serious political and economic
turmoil, Jamil Mahuad was elected president in a
democratic election. A year later, Ecuador saw
one of the worst economic crises in its history
(Sorhegui-Ortega et al., 2021), deepened by
measures taken by Mahuad. Around thirty
banking institutions closed between 1998 and
1999, and by January 2000, Ecuador dropped its
currency in favor of the dollar. The same month,
President Mahuad was overturned and Vice
President Gustavo Noboa, who served until
2003, took office.
Lucio Gutiérrez, a former military man and coup
leader, won a new election in 2003, and was
dismissed after two years. Vice President Alfredo
Palacios took his place until 2007, when new
elections were called. Such an unstable political
panorama fostered the emergence of populist
presidential candidate, Rafael Correa, along with
a new political party called Alianza País, whose
leftist speech against neoliberal policies and
multilateral organizations won him the first of
three consecutive periods, from 2007 to 2017.
The emergence of President Correa and his
Alianza País movement (MPAIS) represents a
moment of recovery of the spaces of governance,
in a process of "constructive destruction", that
puts forward important criticism regarding the
deinstitutionalization of the State, when the
traditional parties' existing structure is weakened
and a new ruling party enters the political arena.
This new ruling party has been consistently
successful in several instances, as it's positioned
a president and the National Assembly, and has
won successive referendums and popular
consultations (Castillo & Granda, 2014).
By 2014, the Ecuadorian political context was
marked by a period of stability, led by President
Rafael Correa and his widely popular "Citizen's
Revolution" project, which ended ten years of
political turmoil in which no president finished
his four-year term (Machado, 2008; Pachano,
2009; Romero-Subia et al., 2022).
It is important to offer a historical description of
the last 25 years of Ecuadorian politics, in order
to understand the relevance and importance of
the 2014 mayoral elections, where political
leaders held three, four and up to five consecutive
reelections in their territories. In 2009, this
scenario of indefinite re-elections came to an end
with the Code of Democracy, which only allows
a single re-election for any popularly elected
seat; therefore, mayors who had already been in
power for several terms had to appoint their
successors.
Electoral system and electoral spending limit
This research seeks to depict the behavior of
electoral spending in a restrictive scenario with a
mandatory and multiparty voting system. The
sample includes the results of the 2014 elections,
number of votes per candidate, electoral
spending limit and the total spending declared by
each candidate in the 221 cities of Ecuador.
In Ecuador, citizens over 18 and under 65 are
required to vote in elections, and citizens over 16
and 65 are encouraged but not required to vote.
Unlike other countries, the list of candidates per
city ranges from 5 to 10 in small and medium-
sized cities, while for the main cities, mayoral
candidates can be as many as 19.
In order to run for a democratically elected seat,
the candidate must belong to a registered political
organization and be over eighteen years old. For
president and vice president, the minimum age
required to be a candidate is thirty-five years old,
and to have been born in the country.
The Democracy Code, passed in 2009, states that
dignitaries may be reelected only once,
consecutively or not; and can never run for the
same position again. This reform ended the
careers of candidates who'd served as mayor for
18 years, such is the case of cities such as
Guayaquil, Machala and Daule; while the city of
Samborondón had reelected the same mayor for
22 years until 2019.
This law became effective for public office
candidates two election periods later. Therefore,
this regulation did not alter the democratic
performance of the 2014 elections, nor did it
affect the subject of this study, as incumbent
behavior was still unregulated back then. A
subsequent study of the 2019 elections will help
to verify whether or not incumbency is inherited
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to a candidate or political party, but we will leave
that for future research.
The legal norm signed in the 2009 Code of
Democracy guarantees the type of electoral
propaganda that can be financed by the State, as
well as the amounts and limits of campaign
spending that a candidate who is running for a
democratically elected seat can use during a
campaign. This is how the State guarantees the
equitable and equal financing of propaganda
through written media, radio, television and
billboards to all candidates.
Furthermore, this Code sets a campaign period of
45 days before the elections. It also establishes
the electoral spending limit that candidates can
use, apart from those of propaganda (that is
already financed by the State). The limit criteria
are the following:
• For presidential tickets, the amount that
results from multiplying USD 0.15 by the
number of citizens in the national registry.
• For National Assembly, Provincial
Assembly and Prefect candidates, a
maximum amount is estimated from
multiplying USD 0.15 for each person in the
registry, according to the respective
jurisdiction, and in no case may the total
limit be less than USD15,000 (for
jurisdictions with fewer than 100,000
registrants).
• For mayoral candidates, the limit is
calculated by multiplying the amount of
USD 0.20 by the number of citizens
registered in the township or metropolitan
registry. In the case of cantons with less than
35,000 registered persons, the spending limit
may not be less than USD 10,000, while for
townships with less than 15,000 registered
persons, the limit may not be less than USD
5,000 per candidate.
• For regional, township or parochial
councilors, the maximum amount is 60% of
the budget assigned to the highest seat of
each jurisdiction respectively.
In 2014, a total of 28,180 candidates for prefects,
mayors, and township council members were
introduced nationwide. For the positions of
Prefect and Vice Prefect, there were a total of 116
candidates in 24 provinces; in 221 townships,
there were 1,201 mayoral candidates, 2,465
candidates for rural councilors, 5,745 for urban
councilors and 18,653 for parish council
members.
Research on the effect of spending concludes that
incumbency brings benefits. Leaving Jacobson's
findings (1978) aside; apart from having a public
advantage based on their position, and regardless
of how effectively they use their budget
compared to their challenger, incumbents will
always have an advantage in the electoral race
based on their campaign investment, with a
permanent effect over time. (Erikson & Palfrey,
1998). In addition, there are favorable conditions
for incumbents that do not rely on campaign
spending. For instance, an incumbent can
campaign constantly by redirecting public
spending toward strategic popular sectors to
increase their acceptance. Favorable economic
performance benefits incumbents in an election
(Veiga & Goncalves, 2004).
However, one of the discussions in this study is
whether the policy of electoral spending limits
equalizes the conditions in the political race. For
Abramowitz (1991), a low spending ceiling
would simply serve to protect the incumbency of
a candidate and promote ineffective competition.
Given that this study focuses on evaluating the
impact of electoral spending and the incumbency
of the 2014 elections, it will only be possible to
demonstrate what effect these variables have on
each candidate.
Methodology
The data collected from the 2014 mayoral
elections in Ecuador contains a total of 1,201
candidates, the budgets spent on the campaign
and the final vote count obtained by each
candidate. Two independent variables are
defined in two econometric multiple regression
models. For each equation the dependent variable
is the percentage of votes that each mayoral
candidate received in their canton (Hernández-
Rojas et al., 2021; Jimber del Río et al., 2020).
The variables described are the following:
• %Voto. - Dependent variable obtained from
the number of votes each candidate received
divided by the total number of votes
registered in that city.
• EFI. - Independent variable obtained by
dividing the expenditure of a candidate for
the spending limit of the city of its
corresponding jurisdiction.
• INCUMB. - Proxy variable used to learn the
effect of incumbency where 1 = incumbent
and 0 = challenger
As explained, we used a multiple linear
regression model to estimate the effects of each
variable on the percentage of votes obtained; two
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statistical models are proposed to compare the
results.
The first model (Model 1) describes the impact
of spending efficiency for each candidate, as can
be seen in formula 1. This model calculates the
interrelation that the efficiency percentage of
electoral spending has on the percentage of votes.
It shows the impact of efficiency in electoral
spending in capturing votes; that is, any
candidate who spends 100% of his budget will be
much more efficient than one who does not
manage to spend his entire budget.
𝑌
𝑖(% 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑜) = 𝛽0+ 𝛽1𝑋1𝑖(𝐸𝐹𝐼) + 𝑒𝑖 (1)
For the second model, the dichotomous variable
INCUMB is incorporated to measure the effect
of incumbency in these elections. Incumbency is
shown to be as important a factor as spending
efficiency. Incumbency exerts a direct advantage
on the contender, due to the incumbent's state of
permanent campaign granted by his position in
office. As has already been shown in other
studies, the directionality of public spending
towards certain sectors benefits acceptance of the
candidate in his re-election.
𝑌
𝑖(% 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑜) = 𝛽0+ 𝛽1𝑋1𝑖(𝐸𝐹𝐼) + 𝛽1𝑋1𝑖(𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑈𝑀𝐵) + 𝑒𝑖
(2)
Results and Discussion
Figura 1. Scatter diagram between percentage of votes an efficiency of electoral spending.
The scatter diagram shows the relationship of
the data obtained from the 2014 mayoral
elections, where, it is observed, the
relationship is direct: the greater or more
efficient spending, the greater the number of
votes obtained. This preliminary result collides
with a positive effect of the law restricting
electoral spending in Ecuador, since it equates
the conditions of all candidates by subjecting
the electoral budget to a ceiling for each of
their campaigns; therefore, to a certain extent,
a restrictive policy equates the conditions of
competitors, provided that this limit is
respected and controlled. The Y axis
represents the candidates' campaign spending
Efficiency and the X axis is the percentage of
votes obtained per candidate. N = 1,201.
Source: Own graph results in R Studio.
To infer the impact of spending on the amount
of votes obtained, we ran the previously
detailed model, the results of models 1 and 2
are presented in Table 1. It should be clarified
that the amount of votes is not determined only
by spending, but this model brings us closer to
understanding the relationship that exists
between the proposed variables. We should
also clarify that there are additional factors that
favor voting intention, such as partisan
sympathy (Angulo, 2015), the candidate's
approach to proposals and policies (Downs,
1957), charisma or affiliation to a political
party. We will not talk about the effect of
populism in this research.
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Table 1.
Results table
Coefficients (Standard Errors)
Independent variables
Model 1
Model 2
Interceptor
0,1054***
0,0918***
0.005-
0.004-
EFI (Efficiency)
0,268***
0,1651***
0.012-
0.0101-
(Incumbency)INCUMB
0,2376***
0.008-
R2
0.2829
0.5769
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
The results establish that there is strong statistical
evidence to reject the hypothesis that the
coefficients are equal to zero; therefore, there is
a correlation between the variables of both
models. The autonomous variable, or interceptor,
establishes that there is a percentage of votes that
does not correspond to the expense or the
candidate's incumbency. The results also
establish an important factor given by R squared,
for Model 1. This value is 0.2829, that is, the
model barely explains 28% of votes obtained
through spending, but when the Incumbency
variable is added, R squared increases to 0.5769,
which strengthens the model, explaining 57% of
the votes obtained. Regarding the variables, in
Model 1, we see that for each percentage change
in spending efficiency, a candidate can get 26%
of a vote.
Conclusions
This study is the first in the Ecuadorian context
to confirm the direct relationship between
campaign spending and the amount of votes
obtained within a restrictive policy for electoral
spending. The results produced by the models
clearly indicate the direct relationship between
electoral spending and the amount of votes
obtained, although not causally: the more a
candidate strives to be efficient in his campaign
spending, the greater their chance of obtaining
more votes.
This first result shows that within the restrictive
spending policy, there is an equitable
competitiveness margin among the contenders in
the electoral race, at least in the Ecuadorian
system. Spending restrictions, limited campaign
time and government financing for parties are
factors that even out the conditions for all the
candidates, provided that the established
deadlines and limits are met.
The second model, on the contrary, shows that
when there is an incumbent, his chances of
winning increase significantly against his direct
challenger. In other words, the incumbent
candidate who opts for reelection gets an
advantage over his opponents. This advantage,
according to several authors, responds to the
investment made by the incumbents during their
time in office, which has a direct impact on the
voter; while other authors infer that it is the
candidate's experience which translates in voting
intention in his favor.
The current reelection policies promote a more
active political intervention, since, when
indefinite reelection was eliminated, the
candidates or political parties lost the advantages
of incumbency to continue in power, as occurred
in the last 20 years in Ecuador. The two-term
reelection law prompted some mayors to pass on
incumbency to their children by positioning them
as candidates for their seat. The effect of this
phenomenon has not yet been measured and will
be the subject of new research.
To conclude, an electoral scenario with a policy
of electoral spending ends up increasing the
inequalities between an incumbent candidate and
a challenger, due to the advantage of the former
on the political scene. The limit of electoral
spending coerces the advantage that campaign
investment generates for a challenging candidate,
spending is so important in attracting votes that
the limitations harm free competition.
Debating whether or not a spending control
policy is beneficial is not conclusive in this study,
since this control allows us to observe the
behavior of certain political parties and
candidates in an electoral contest. If a candidate
is not efficient in his campaign spending, it
should be cause to limit his participation in future
elections as a measure refining the electoral
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register, where control entities reward or punish
participation based on its efficiency.
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