Volume 12 - Issue 61
/ January 2023
69
http:// www.amazoniainvestiga.info ISSN 2322- 6307
DOI: https://doi.org/10.34069/AI/2023.61.01.8
How to Cite:
Poiarkova, T. (2023). “Russian World” as a political and cultural weapon of modern Russia. Amazonia Investiga, 12(61), 69-79.
https://doi.org/10.34069/AI/2023.61.01.8
“Russian World” as a political and cultural weapon of modern Russia
“Русский мир” як політико-культурна зброя сучасної Росії
Received: January 5, 2023 Accepted: February 12, 2023
Written by:
Tetiana Poiarkova32
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2272-490X
Researcher ID Web of Science: CAH-2344-2022
Abstract
This article raises the question of “Russian
world” political and cultural concept that is the
mobilizing and legitimating factor not only for
citizens of Russia but also for Russian speaking
people from other countries in the Russian-
Ukrainian war. The author grounds the idea that
the political concept of “Russian world” is
conditioned by: the potential that is a pledge of
power and survival keeping for the regime of
post-communist Russia; the ability to create new
solidarity beyond territory and history that will
compensate psychological consequences of
dramatic concatenation of political humiliation,
economic decline, cultural nihilism and general
chaos after the defeat in the Cold War and ruining
of the USSR; striving for justification of military
invasion into the territory of independent
Ukraine and system terror against civilian
population. The article answers the question why
in the Russian-Ukrainian confrontation we can
see the dehumanization of Ukrainians as an
enemy and the increase in the infringement of all
the rules of modern war (mass marauding,
assaults and shootings, moving of civilian
population to filtration camps and total
destruction of social infrastructure in just those
cities where the majority of population speak
Russian and are well disposed to the concept of
“Russian world”).
Keywords: “Russian world”, Russian-Ukrainian
war, “ruscism” (Russian fascism).
Introduction
The Russian-Ukrainian war (begun in March
2014 and has been conducted up to the present
32
Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor. Head of the Department of Political Science and Sociology Departments of the Faculty of
Social Sciences and Humanities at the Borys Grinchenko Kyiv University, Kyiv, Ukraine.
time) is one of the most actual questions of
political science. It is connected with
70
www.amazoniainvestiga.info ISSN 2322- 6307
peculiarities of this military conflict which has
two phases. The first one is the prolonged period
(from February 2014 to February 2022), when
military operations were concentrated in so-
called Lugansk and Donetsk People's Republics
(further LPR and DPR) being under control of
the RF. The second phase began on 24.02.22. Of
that day V. Putin made the announcement: “I
have approved the decision to conduct the special
military operation. Its aim is to defend people
who have been suffering from genocide of Kyiv
regime for eight years. To stop this we will long
for demilitarization and denazification of
Ukraine” (Putin, 2022).
An actualizing factor is the character of Russian-
Ukrainian confrontation that unites fierce
fighting and massive information impact. These
circumstances determine the arguments for the
consequence of the ideas of “Russian World” that
not only legitimate Russian policy, but also are
the factor to mobilise the social thought of
Russian society against Ukraine.In our opinion,
the Russian-Ukrainian confrontation actualizes
the consideration of the Russian world as a
means of defeating this war. It is important that
“Russian world” embraces both individual and
social outlooks, taken together, motivate the
justification of Russian-Ukrainian military
confrontation. In other words, the course of
Russian-Ukrainian war actualizes the study of
“Russian world” as an ideological and world
outlook means of its legitimization.
The hypothesis of our research was the
assumption that “Russian world” turned into an
informational weapon of the Russian-Ukrainian
war, as it acted as a foundation: 1) for the
solidarity of Russian society based on the picture
of the world, which is common to the post-Soviet
space; 2) universal meaningful life guidelines
that replaced ideological schemes with a
generalization of the common experience of
survival in the USSR; 3) subjectivity of Russians,
which allowed them to join world history and
build their own identity.
Theoretical Framework
Our article is based on the assumption that
“Russian world” refers to ambiguous concepts
that, without a final definition, have several
general approaches to interpretation.
For example, collective article “Who identifies
with the “Russian World”?...” believe that the
term “Russian World” has ancient historical
roots and a practical definition, however, the
geopolitical design of this term was discussed
and refined in Russian political and cultural
circles during Putin's presidency (O’Loughlina,
Toalb & Kolosovc, 2016).
B. Özpek in his work “The Role of Democracy
in the Recognition of De Facto States: An
Empirical Assessment” interpreted “Russian
World” as oblast or de facto state-like entities
that are part of the influence of the RF (Özpek,
2014). De facto states are considered as political
authorities operating in a certain territory without
international legal recognition. However, de
facto states strive to achieve the recognition of
other states in order to be considered legitimate
participants in the international system.
Some authors within the framework of the
proposed approach Ukraine is classified as a
“gray zone” country (Sergunin, 2004). Let's
remind that Th. Carothers, outlining his vision of
the gray area, warned this regime exists in two
phases, the first phase being a flawed,
unproductive pluralism, and the second phase
being dominated by a single political force or
central authority (Carothers, 2002).
Within these frameworks Ukraine is a typical
example of a “gray zone” state because
democratic institutions are present in the political
system, but the actual rules by which this system
functions are far from democratic standards. The
reality of the functioning of various institutions
introduced into the political system in the gray
zone largely depends on local economic, cultural
and historical conditions, as well as on the
experience accumulated in the process of
transformation.
“Russian world” as a rallying point for self-
determination after the collapse of the Soviet
Union, which simultaneously has and
geopolitical context and plays the role of a
substitute for the “national idea”. Here, the
“Russian world” is based on the following ideas:
1) the priority of Russia’s national interests; the
secondary role of “all-human” or
cosmopolitan values;
2) Russia should remain a great power with a
major voice in the international community;
3) Russia’s main national interest consists of
ensuring the country’s security and
territorial integrity.
Another interpretation of “Russian World” is
based on the positioning RF of the as the
antithesis of the modern West (Fedoseeva &
Solomatin, 2015). The phenomenon of courage,
its use as a resource in the global civilizational
Poiarkova, T. / Volume 12 - Issue 61: 69-79 / January, 2023
Volume 12 - Issue 61
/ January 2023
71
http:// www.amazoniainvestiga.info ISSN 2322- 6307
competition is considered. The emasculation of
masculinity is the reverse side of the
development of Western civilization, which
claims to have a global meaning. A number of
factors with a historical dimension and a complex
influence on the decline of manhood are
proposed. Russia can and should take advantage
of this de-passionization of the West in the
course of civilizational competition, which is
intensifying now.
The understanding of “Russian world” as a
cultural and spiritual unity of “Orthodox
peoples” is gaining popularity (Ksenofontov,
2018). In modern conditions both in Russia and
abroad the church acted and acts as a support of
the Russian culture, traditions and Russian
identity. It should be noted that it is actively
included in the general cultural processes of the
global and regional levels.
So, in the Russian world, national holidays have
become Days of Slavic writing and culture,
Christmas, Easter, Epiphany celebrations. It is
characteristic that such important Orthodox
holidays that arose in the historical past are
carefully are preserved not only in neighboring
countries, but also far. They are especially
revered in countries where a fairly large
population professing Orthodoxy lives. Among
these countries, we note First of all, Serbia,
where more than 6 million Orthodox; Bulgaria,
where over 80% of the population is Orthodox;
Greece, where 8 million residents adhere to
Orthodoxy.
At present, within Russian society interaction
between state and church in a number of areas,
based on organizational bases of joint
commissions and committees. Among them such
as:
1) activities for the restoration and return to
service of unique historical and cultural
monuments;
2) regular holding of joint cultural, creative
actions, competitions, festivals;
3) Church also actively manifests itself in the
fight against alcoholism, neglect, crime;
4) promotes the formation, especially among
young people, of a culture of interethnic and
interfaith relations, fight against extremism
and nationalism.
It must be stated that the “Russian world”as a
component of the military confrontation between
the RF and Ukraine receives a different definition
depending on the definition of the essence of this
war.
So, some representatives of scientific society
(Datsyuk, 2014; Magda, 2015; Pocheptsov,
2018) regard this military conflict as a “hybrid
war” dominating by such peculiarities of its
conducting as: 1) asymmetry of actions that let
grade enemy’s advantages in military conflict; 2)
stake on information component that leads to
factual conquest of one state by another with
formal saving of sovereignty.
At the same time there is a scientific school
which is built around works by Ch. Tilly,
A. Toffler, M. vanCreveld; M. Kaldor and
certifies the appearance of “new wars”
(Van Creveld, 1991; Tilly, 1993; Toffler, 1993;
Kaldor, 1999). The characteristic feature of such
wars is the fact that they are conducted by means
of “cleaning-up the territory” on the grounds of
irredentism – ethnic mobilization by the
reunification of areas, where ethnic minorities
live, with the areas, where this ethnos is in
majority.
To our mind, precisely such a combination of
these two views understanding of wars of XX-
XXI centuries let depict the peculiarities of the
Russian-Ukrainian war. Namely, broad support
for:
1) actions by Russian citizens in relation to
Ukraine from the annexation of the Crimea
to military support of LPR and DPR;
2) terror against the civilian population from
persecution and criminal encroachment to
looting committed by residents of the post-
Soviet space, to which migrants of different
generations – from both the USSR and the
RF.
Methodology
The purpose of our work is to study the “Russian
world” as a complex political and cultural
concept, which has different definitions
depending on: 1) memory, where of great
importance are knowing of own history parental,
realized assertion of strongholds in the formation
of own independence history, achievement of
social and science consensus concerning
important events in the history of the country,
detailed analysis of Russian history; 2) realities,
where communications serve as channels
complementing historical, philosophical and
religious discourses in order to create cultural
space; 3) creation of strategies for the future
which takes place on the ontological grounds.
All this, in its turn, determines the
methodological focus of the analysis that should
72
www.amazoniainvestiga.info ISSN 2322- 6307
consider the impossibility to give “Russian
world” just only one determination, such as
1) ethnographic definition of similarity between
East Slavic peoples; 2) political and legitimate
definition of genealogy definition of “Russian
state” and “Russian church”; 3) ethno-nationalist
definition of the “network of Russian speaking
and Russian culture societies”.
So, can agree with Volkovskyis thought, the
analysis of “Russian world” as the legitimating
accompaniment of Russian-Ukrainian military
confrontation conditions the necessity to
combine the analysis of ideas, systems of
categories, outlook values, logic and
argumentation with the study of alogisms and
absurdity (Volkovskyi, 2021).
All these circumstances ground the
methodological frames for scientific research of
“Russian world” as a complicated cultural
concept that combines general philosophic
methods, phenomenology and hermeneutics with
the analysis of the historical context of this
doctrine creation taking into account the
systemic grounds for spreading of individual and
collective consciousness patterns.
Results and Discussion
All this determines the need to consider “Russian
world” as a unique witnessing and socio-cultural
experience that served as the basis for the
legitimization of the war against Ukrainians. And
this, in turn, leads to the definition of the essence
of war, where the weapon is the assimilation and
interpretation of collective ideas about
modernity, which took place on the basis of
stereotypes of thoughts and actions that are stable
in public memory.
This is due to the fact that “Russian world” is
positioned as a “reproduction of historical
justice” – at the same time as an imperial
irredenta in the borders of 1913, and as the Soviet
irredenta in the borders of 1989. Really
demonstrative is V. Putin’s speech: “Russia
would have won the war without Ukraine” from
16.12.2010, where he depreciated not only the
contribution of Ukrainians into the Victory in the
World War II but also the quantity of losses
(when every ninth Ukrainian was lost)
(Ligostova, 2010). It is important that as to the
Russian official propaganda the main
traitors/collaborators in this war are Ukrainian
nationalists. But they suppress information about
Russian Liberation Army (RLA) as a
collaborative company formed of Soviet
prisoners of war during World War II in
Germany headed by lieutenant-general
A. Vlasov. In such disrespectful tone RF’s
official propaganda treats the creation of
independent Ukraine in 1991 – as a result of the
greatest geopolitical injustice – ruining of the
USSR.
Such a fatal absence of critical perception of the
Russian-Ukrainian war by “Russian world”
supporters (both in the RF and Ukraine) is based
on the manipulative interpretation of history and
on the notions about Ukraine as a failed state and
recognition of Ukrainians as secondary nation
constantly dependant from Russian imperial
projects.
Cynicism of “Russian world” world outlook is
demonstratively incarnated in Putin’s statement
that: 1) “the real sovereignty of Ukraine is
possible only in the partnership with Russia”;
2) relations between Russians and Ukrainians
had been forming for centuries; 3) “Together we
always were and will be much stronger and more
successful, as we are one nation” (Putin, 2021).
The quintessence of “Russian world” is
presented in Putin’s words spoken on the
16.03.2022: “Appearance of Russian troops near
Kyiv and other cities of Ukraine is not connected
with the intention to occupy this country, we do
not have such an aim” (Putin, 2022).
The real values of “Russian world” world
outlook construction is testified by the events
have been happening since the 24.02.2022,
where the ambitions on great spirituality totally
smashed onto the realities of bombing of
residential areas and medical establishments,
terror against civilian population, making of
filtration camps for displaced people and
mocking at prisoners of war. And all these
against a background of full-scale ruining of
cities and villages, residents of which were
Russian speaking citizens of Ukraine.
It is important to understand the essence of the
“Russian world”, this interpretation of it as a part
of geopolitical reality. When in the frames of
world-systematic approach by I. Wallerstein they
assume the unique belonging of Russia to two
world systems: Eurasian and Orthodox
(Wallerstein, 1991, 1974).
This fact turns “Russian world” into social super
system, reproduction of which is supplied by the
interlacing of geopolitical interests, economies,
social roles of cultural space, influence of
spiritual system with personal vision of
interpersonal relations, ideals and models of
Volume 12 - Issue 61
/ January 2023
73
http:// www.amazoniainvestiga.info ISSN 2322- 6307
behavior. As to the place in modern geopolitical
environment, the role of second and third sort
countries is connected only with countries’
interests that make the nucleus in west-centric
world system.
The mentioned above definition of “Russian
world” is related to its understanding as the result
of turning Russia from object into subject of
world policy, that was certified firstly by
occupation and further annexation of Crimean
peninsula. Namely from this point of view
“Russian word” was studied in the work by
V. Katasonov “America vs Russia. Cold War
2.0.” (Katasonov, 2014). Here “Russian world”
is a product of world oligarchy’s backdrop to the
regeneration of Russia that was realized into the
war with the USA under the banner of
globalization and is conducted in Malorossiya as
a part of “Russian world”. Under such conditions
military assistance to LPR-DPR is moral-
humanitarian help of “Russian world” to its own
parts, and in such a way it renovates political and
economical power.
The aim of special military operation is not less
demonstrative – “Our main point is to defend the
RF from military threat that is made by western
countries which make attempts to use Ukrainian
people in the battle against our country” (Koval,
2022). The fact that followers of “Russian world”
ideas live in countries with different political
foundations and with striking differences in level
and style of life and belong to different political
realities brings into question the explanation of
this concept’s success only by the adequacy of
propaganda attempts to basic national
identification.
A. de Tangi in her book “The Great Migration:
Russia and Russians after the Fall of the Iron
Curtain” passes an opinion that irredentism of
Russian- authorities of the RF sees the area of
former USSR as the natural sphere of their
influence (Tangi, 2012, p. 17). Distinctive
feature of Russian migrants’ behavior is in
demonstration of general tendency of global
world, where “migrants can be active actors of
transnational policy”, and “migrations can
transform the system of international relations
making new areas not coinciding with national
borders” (Tangi, 2012, p. 18-19).
In this context, it is important that S. Pereslegin
in his article “Self-instruction manual for playing
on the “world chessboard”. Classics of
geopolitics, ХΙХ century” introduced the notion
“anthropoflows” which connects demographic
migrations and “social processes that carry
identity”. They at the same time form the
geopolitical map of the world and are the source
of ethno-cultural groups’ movement (Pereslegin,
2003, p. 697).
Russian-Ukrainian confrontation demonstrates
how “Russian world” is turning into the weapon
on the grounds of the sacralization of Russia that
causes identity changes not only in Russia but in
Ukraine as well. It is popular to consider
“Russian world” to be the unique moral oriented
unit of world civilization that is opposed to
western empires, directed on the exploitation of
colonies by means of break and out-recoding of
civilizational grounds and traditions of other
peoples (Filimonov & Danyuk, 2016, p. 98).
Here “Russian world” is a harmonious
community that serves like a substratum for the
development of peoples who voluntary joined the
empire.
The imperative of the existence of “Russian
world” is maxim – “Russians don’t desert their
own”. The grounds for this are assertion about
metaphysical and political unity of RF’s image,
general mythologization of everything, that is
Russian a sign of special valour in opposition to
evil as a whole (fascism in particular) and the fact
of cultural opposition of RF to NATO countries
(Poiarkova, 2022). For understanding of the
essence of “Russian world” it is important to
state that the rules of the existence of “Russian
world” – unity and equality of different ethnic
groups and cultures of empire under the leading
role of Russian people – were formed by I. Stalin
in 1945.
The definition of “Russian world” as the
ideology of post-Soviet space was given by
Patriarch Kyryl at the opening ceremony of the
3-d Assembly of Russian world on 3.09.2009. He
sees “Russian world” as a complicated
phenomenon that, firstly, unites the flock of
Russia Orthodox Church and takes Russian
culture as the basis of national identity. Secondly,
this is the answer to globalization questions as an
attempt to make an independent subject of world
formation on the basis of cultural and national
identity (Patriarch Kyryl, 2009).
To Patriarch Kyryl’s mind, the existence of
“Russian world” as combined civilizational
space is focused around the nucleus made of
Russia, Ukraine and Belarus (without common
political institutions) and demands overcoming
such tasks of different levels as: cooperation of
civil societies and creation of strong relationship
between elites of different countries which are
parts of this civilizational space.
74
www.amazoniainvestiga.info ISSN 2322- 6307
The opinion that “Russian world” is a system of
shared values of traditional society that is
opposed to individual liberal one is rather
widespread. For instance, G. Zaporozhtseva
(former citizen of Kyiv, now she is a political
émigré) in the article “On the ways of returning
Ukraine to the bosom of the Russian world”
considers Maidan to be the event caused by mass
hysteria premised by existential crisis of modern
liberal society’s crisis (Zaporozhtseva, 2016,
p.122). Maidan is an antithesis of “Russian
world” as it made the atmosphere of unity by
means of happy-enzyme, and this can explain the
euphoria of tens of thousands of people which led
to dreadful political consequences – falling out of
the unified civilizational oykumena.
In the article written N.Ovchinnikova,
Y.Kovalchuk (by the “citizens of LRR-DPR”)
“On the cultural fronts of the Russian spring” ‒
“Russian world” is treated as a changing factor of
the conception of the world. The authors, who are
contemporaries of the events an 2014, state that
“Russian world” is a project that “changed the
essence of life” for Russian speaking people in
the east of Ukraine because “among members of
people's volunteer corps there were anarchists,
communists, neopagans, monarchists, socialists,
skinheads, “professional Russians” and others”,
in the minds of which “there was real chaos. And
even those, who were devoted to personal
persuasions from now and then, lost his or her
belief…” (Ovchinnikova, & Kovalchuk, 2016,
p.49-50).
In our opinion, to understand the essence of the
“Russian world” as a cultural project it is
necessary to consider its role in gaining and
keeping of Putin regime’s power. From this
viewpoint the three-volume edition “Project
Russia” by anonymous author is demonstrative
(2008-2009). The edition was marked by
extralarge number of printed copies and multiple
reprints, that indicates he order from ruling
stratum of the RF. In that anonymous work they
proposed to unite elements of inheritance and
appointment by election in order to unite “the
best qualities of monarchy” and “the best
qualities of Soviet system” (Anonymous, 2008,
p. 344). The advantages of the mentioned above
proposition were as follows: 1) to achieve the
maximum authority of regime; 2) to liquidate the
disadvantages of monarchy; 3) to form real
elitism by means of participation of only
privileged people in elections. The main pledge
of success in advancement of RF’s project as a
“New kingdom” was going to be the ability to
orientate modern people to take decisions by
“heart”, being supported by Orthodox tradition,
not by “stomach”, based on democratic
postulates, because “the tsar authorities is the
power of secular institution in the person of Tsar
and spiritual institution in he person of Patriarch,
and these two institutions balance each other”
(Anonymous, 2008, p.346).
H. Pirchner in his work “Post Putin: Succession,
Stability, and Russia's Future” distinguished such
stride that became the ground for Putin’s power
and his supporters (Pirchner, 2019, p.90-99).
First of all, this is the strengthening of KGB
former structures letting them control private
business (e.g. FSB (Federal Security Service).
Secondly, it is the centralization of power in the
frames of FSB and FIS (Foreign Intelligence
Service), power restrictions for regional
governors, appointing of President
representatives in regions. President
representatives started to control patronage
service in their regions – including the right to
appoint the chiefs of militia in those regions. In
the same way the consolidation of power is
supplied by the Law “About Political Parties”,
which restricts the number of parties recognized
by the state. It is quite significant that in 2004 the
elections of regional governors were abolished.
Since 2000s, there have been taken some
measures concerning the prohibition for civil
servants to have assets abroad. Since 2018, they
have made structures of prior collection of
information about dissidence among military
men.
Thirdly, political influence of oligarchs was
restricted by criminal prosecutions and giving
preference to those who supported the Kremlin.
Fourthly, it is the suppression of mass media by
means of intimidation, physical persecution and
criminal homicides amid the creation of FSB
structures that make federal supervision over
radio and TV.
Fifthly, high emphasis was placed on the
upbringing of young people that implies two
directions. The first one is the system of
measures pointed to form beliefs and ideas
concerning history, where the role of I. Stalin is
presented as an essential condition for the victory
in the Second World War, but repressions (e.g.
activity of GULAG (Directory-General for
camps, the unified camp system of the USSR.
The full name is the Directory-General of forced
labour camp and correctional labour settlements)
practically isn’t explained. And the network of
nationwide organizations (similar to the Soviet
Young Pioneers and Young Communist League)
based on putinism have been made.
Volume 12 - Issue 61
/ January 2023
75
http:// www.amazoniainvestiga.info ISSN 2322- 6307
Sixthly, the campaign against religious
organizations (except those which are loyal) and
non-governmental organizations based on threats
to national security (the closing of human rights
activists’ organization “Memorial” is very
revealing. It was created by the Nobel laureate
A. Sacharov).
Seventhly, this is the persecution of dissidents
which is done in two ways: by means of control
over electoral process and increase in
imprisonments for unauthorized rallies, for
information in social networks. Especially
indicative is the creation of Investigation
Committee of the RF in 2011, where ordinary
citizens are encouraged to write dilations.
So, in the RF a vicious circle was formed – when
the condition of regime survival is “Russian
world” as nationalistic-imperialistic ideology
which causes territorial expansion to demonstrate
the viability of Putin regime to in-country
population. To fulfil the regulation they linked
bribery of elites and structures- successor of
KGB, redistribution of money gained from oil
and gas selling and removal of population from
politics by means of intimidation.
All these circumstances together make multi-
layered concept of Russian world that combines
political powerlessness of Russian people and
which T. Snyder in his work “The War in
Ukraine Has Unleashed a New Word” called
demonstrative messianic cynicism aimed to
discredit common to mankind values, democratic
procedures and standards, promotion RF’s edge
over the whole world (Snyder, 2022). Just this, as
T. Snyder thinks, conditions the fact that “Putin’s
ethnic imperialism insists that Ukrainians must
be Russians because they speak Russian. They do
‒ and they speak Ukrainian. But Ukrainian
identity has as much to do with an ability to live
between languages than it does with the use of
any one of them”. In this context we can agree
with the statement that “The War in Ukraine Is
the True Culture War” because “Russians do not
understand Ukrainian, because they have not
learned it. Ukrainians do understand Russian,
because they have learned it. This fact has
battlefield implications. Ukrainian soldiers often
speak Russian, though they are instructed to use
Ukrainian to spot infiltrators and spies. This is a
drastic example of a general practice of code-
switching”.
Neocolonial character of the Russian-Ukrainian
war has one more symptom which isn’t often
noticed and consequently isn’t taken into
consideration. To T. Snyder’s mind this is “the
imperial character of the Russian state, a very
high proportion of the Russian soldiers in
Ukraine belong to national minorities. This
suggests a deeper problem, which is that even
soldiers dying for a fascist cause need not be
fascists themselves” (Snyder, 2022).
All mentioned above simulacra reveals the
disrespect to Ukrainians because of their colonial
secondariness and explains the animal behaviour
of Russian invaders in Ukraine. So, it is not a
contingency that the RF is systematically ruining
culture infrastructure as the basis of collective
memory, including museums, educational
establishments, theatres, houses, parks, shopping
centres. Very characteristic for “Russian world”
is the promise to liberate “their own people”
realised in the frames of the Russian-Ukrainian
military confrontation and where the list of
completely destroyed cities – Chernigiv,
Mariupol, Irpin, Severodonetsk – fixes the
crimes against mainly Russian speaking civilian
population.
Such regressions of socio-political mind, which
testify the breaking up of individual morality and
intellectual self-control and make recall the
nature of such phenomena as the manifestation of
social traumas compensation by means of turning
to the initial archetypes: cruelty and violence. In
this context, it is to the point to appeal to the
opinion of W. Reich, who was a contemporary
and researcher of the nature of fascism and
thought that fascism substituted grounds for
social solidarity (Reich, 1980). The reasons for
such a situation were, first of all, in chaos of
political and economic life that facilitated the
formation of “childish necessity in defense” and
focus transmission from personal life to
“Führer”. The other reason was in the specific
structure of German society, where the First
World War ruined the considerable part of
middle class, and minor bourgeois, bureaucrats
and employees became dependant from state
power (Reich, 1980, p. 117, 95).
The attractiveness of such a situation is in simple
explanations that might be given to drawbacks of
the world. So, reasons of social failures are in
actions of enemies, driving force of which is the
envy to wealth, special history and extraordinary
spirituality of Russia as the successor of the
USSR. In its turn, giving simple explanations to
complicated problems of the present time gives a
chance to an average person to answer for
nothing.
In this context the pantheon of heroes and
glorious victories of “Russian world” are rather
76
www.amazoniainvestiga.info ISSN 2322- 6307
demonstrative and embrace not only different
layers of history but also reconcile irreconcilable
antipodes. All these features are transformed into
traits of real heroes who came to Ukraine as
marginal people and quickly transformed into
transmitters of special spirituality of fighters with
fascism and gain the indulgence concerning
criminal assaults and proper material supply in
the form of stolen belongings having belonged to
supporters of Ukrainian junta.
To our mind, mentioned above let suppose that
the attractiveness of “Russian world” may be
based on new, implemented by globalization,
social processes which help make a new type of
solidarity beyond the territory and time (by
means of concentration on the past). This
confirms A. Toffler’s remark that technological
achievements desynchronize time and space
characteristics and on this basis they form new
types of relations, overcoming any space and
time restrictions (Toffler & Toffler, 2006, 51).
Indeed, new means of communication
(instruments of which are social networks)
transform into adaptive means of adaptation to
the present time, that is chaotically changing and
makes t easier to appeal to something which is
taken as an unbreakable rule and turn into the
guaranty of survival. On the other hand, an
attempt to find the support in the past stipulates
for general loss the meaning of life as the
imitation of the USSR experience in rearmament,
army and interminable trainings of military men,
unification of population against inner and outer
enemies – are the actions which hide the lack of
desired image of the future.
This explains the amorphism of “Russian world”
ideology, where the aspiration for having a
powerful state by any means and for any price is
the means toreach the ideals. Under the
circumstances of diffusiveness of ideological
guiding, compensatory process conditions on the
search of such world outlook constructions,
which would be able to be “supplemented
reality” (a border between reality and virtuality),
as it will give the sense of existence in
permanently traumatizing reality.
To our mind, to properly understand the cultural
concept of “Russian world” it is necessary to pay
attention on the fact that unprecedented losses of
the RF in the Russian-Ukrainian war cause
consolidation of Russians against Ukrainians,
who are seen as an existential threat demanding
the only scenario of war “to the victory”.
In this context, it is also indicative that among
those Russians who quickly fled abroad from the
“partial mobilization” (announced) ‒ the motives
were not so much protest against the war with
Ukraine itself, but rather disagreement to directly
take part in it. A similar motivation is inherent in
Russian mothers, who are outraged not by the
war with Ukraine itself, but by the violation of
promises not to attract conscripts to participate in
hostilities in Ukraine.
As we can see, dehumanisation of the enemy
leads to stopping of critical thinking, when
instead of focusing the efforts against putinism
Russian society shows the behaviour of “social
animals”. This collective move resembles the
animal behavior and is distinguished by the unity
of direction, solidarity and follow the patterns
and regurgitate the arguments given by Russian
mass media propaganda as to the demarcation
into “their own and others”.
Most tellingly, this inclination to mass and
copied behaviour in Russian society manifests
itself in hatred against the dissidents and making
of detachments to harass Russians who speak out
against the war with Ukraine. Thus, activity of so
called “Putin’s troops” made of aged supporters
is very demonstrative.
Conclusions
So, Russian world is a synonym of Russian
fascism the essence of which is noteworthy
implemented into the practice of
Dehumanization of everything that is Ukrainian.
That's why the heated phase of the Russian-
Ukrainian war (from 24.02.2022 to nowadays) is
under the slogans of endless lies that includes
such narratives as “everything is Ukrainians’
fault” and bombing and shootings of civilian
population are theatrical productions, where
Armed Forces of Ukraine are shelling their
countrymen and then place corpses stealthily in
order to accuse the liberating mission of the RF
of everything.
All mentioned above indicate that “Russian
world” is noted for different interpretations made
on common principles, such as: Orthodox faith,
Russian culture and language, common historical
memory and views on social development.
In our opinion, interpretations of “Russian
world” – common political environment, part of
geopolitical reality, reproduction of historical
truth, world outlook surrogate – all these together
let the fragment of different periods’ essences to
coexist without conflicts – an original “symbiosis
Volume 12 - Issue 61
/ January 2023
77
http:// www.amazoniainvestiga.info ISSN 2322- 6307
of incompatible” made of mixture of symbols,
persuasions and ideas.
In other words, Multilayer interpretation of
“Russian world” includes: 1) unified church
which formed civilizatinal unity; 2) territory of
common language; 3) unity on the basis of
common history, where the best way of existence
was empire.
As we can see, undeniable advantage of “Russian
world” construc is the ability to adapt to the
traumatizing reality by means of concealing the
responsibilities for the present time. Thus, the
conception of “strong power” is the main factor
organizing the being, where person’s role is
reduced to a small screw.
It is not an element of chance that “Russian
world” is based on the transformation of
conception about the past. The reason of this is in
search for solving of present time problems in the
past – in the space of familiar images and
readymade excuses. The result of such an
approach is losing the grip of present time reality.
Undoubtedly, “Russian world” bears the imprint
of nostalgia for idealized life in the USSR, where
the total irresponsibility was compensated by
social guarantees, and right eclipsed
responsibility. This is an unwillingness to grow
up, public permission to be social teenager and
believe that rules can be broken for the sake of
“our own people”.
Different interpretations of “Russian world” let
abstract this concept in understanding of
common political environment which appeared
on the basis of residual unity of civilizing,
cultural, social, family, production,
infrastructural and economic relations, existing
in spite of borders that appeared after the
dissolution of the USSR. In these frames there is
the inner circle of “Russian world” in the form of
the RF and the outer one which include Russian
speaking people abroad.
Russian peace is a worldview concept that acts as
a substitute stability of the existence of the
statehood of the RF and is determined by
fixations in concrete-historical ideology and with
the help of traditions preserved in public
consciousness.
Russian peace is a means of objectifying social
consciousness as a result of the cognitive activity
of a certain set of individuals united by cultural
heritage, language, mentality, time and space.
The Russian world is an interrelationship of
social consciousness and worldview traditions
that are fixed historically, where worldview
traditions are always concrete and belong to the
historical time of the post-Soviet society of the
modern RF.
It is important that the subjects who fall into the
sphere of political and cultural influence of
“Russian World” have the opportunity to
continue the socio-cognitive creative process of
assimilation of the post-Soviet space and time by
their own or joint efforts, creating a real
relationship between human thoughts, words and
deeds. “Russian world is a proposition of feeling
of unity for former citizens of the USSR based on
struggle for justice for “their own people”, that
justify law-breakings as it turns marginal person
into hero, and Internet spreads popularity, and
stolen belongings make the illusion of successful
life.
If we consider mentality not only as an image and
a way of thinking, but also an image and a way
of acting ‒ “thought” (and such a combination is
legitimate, since mental stereotypes are
perceived unconsciously, where they assume
critical discursive thinking, but give rise to only
spontaneous, unconscious actions of the
individual), then the “Russian world” can be
considered as a substitute for historical heredity,
which allows the traumatized post-Soviet society
of Russia to preserve its integrity in the process
of socio-historical development, which is
impossible without the transmission provided by
the traditions from generation to generation of
axiological, semantic and teleological worldview
elements. It is this continuity that makes
representatives of the “Russian world” subjects
of world history, determining their historicity.
Heredity in social consciousness ensures the
connection of eras, moreover, the historical past
can act as a real factor in the formation and
development of the social system only because
such continuity exists.
Thus, world outlook construct of “Russian
world” changed into weapon against Ukraine
through the potential of its own – ability to form
new solidarity beyond territory and time, which
can compensate dramatic coincidence of military
defeat, political humiliation, economic fall,
cultural nihilism and general chaos.
Bibliographic references
Anonymous, (2008). Project Russia. Moscow:
Eksmo, 384 p. (In Russian) ISBN: 978-5-
699-21307-8
78
www.amazoniainvestiga.info ISSN 2322- 6307
Arbeláez-Campillo, D., Tatsiy, V.,
Rojas-Bahamón, M., & Danilyan, O. (2020).
Contributions of critical thinking as a form of
participation and political deliberation.
Amazonia Investiga, 9(27), 5-12.
https://doi.org/10.34069/AI/2020.27.03.1
Carothers, T. (2002). The End of the Transition
Paradigm. Journal of Democracy, 13(1), 1-
17. Retrieved from
https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/02/Carothers-13-1.pdf
Datsyuk, S. (2014). Russia's War against
Ukraine: Three Components. Independent
culturological hour painting. http://www.ji-
magazine.lviv.ua/anons2014/Datsyuk_Vojna
_Rosii_protiv_Ukrainy_tri_sostavlyayuschiy
e.htm (In Russian)
Fedoseeva, I.A., & Solomatin, E.V. (2015).
Transformation of masculinity in Russian
society. Scientific and Practical Journal
“Humanization of Education”. Retrieved
from
https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/transformats
iya-muzhestvennosti-v-rossiyskom-
obschestve (in Russian)
Filimonov, G., & Danyuk, N. (2016). The
Russian world is at the epicenter of a
geopolitical war. Izborsky club. Russian
strategies. Doctrine of the Russian world, No.
6-7 (42-43), 98-109. (In Russian)
Kaldor, M. (1999). New and Old Wars:
Organized Violence in a Global Era.
Stanford. University Press, 216 p.
Katasonov, V. (2014). America vs Russia. Cold
War 2.0. Moscow. “Book World”, 447 p.
Retrieved from https://acortar.link/lj3PfU (in
Russian)
Koval, O. (2022). Putin announced a special
operation against Ukraine after the appeal of
the leaders of the “LPR-DPR”. Ua.news.
https://ua.news/ru/ukraine/putin-obyavil-
provedenit-spetsoperatsii-protiv-ukrainy-
posle-obrashheniya-glavarej-l-dnr. (In
Russian)
Ksenofontov, V. (2018). Russian world and the
orthodox base. Russian world and its
orthodox foundation, № 3, 207-210.
Retrieved from
https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/russkiy-mir-
i-ego-pravoslavnoe-osnovanie (in Russian)
Ligostova, O. (2010). Russia would have won the
war even without Ukraine. Voz de América.
https://ukrainian.voanews.com/a/putin-2010-
12-16-112019064/237398.html (in
Ukrainian)
Magda, E. (2015). Hybrid Warfare. Survive and
win.
http://bookshelf.ucoz.ua/news/magda_e_v_g
ibridnaja_vojna_vyzhit_i_pobedit_2015_rtf_
pdf/2016-08-18-13547 (in Russian)
O’Loughlina J., Toalb, G., & Kolosovc V.
(2016). Who identifies with the “Russian
World”? Geopolitical attitudes in
southeastern Ukraine, Crimea, Abkhazia,
South Ossetia, and Transnistria Eurasian
Geography and Economics, 57(6),
745-778
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2017.12
95275
Ovchinnikova, N., & Kovalchuk, Y. (2016). On
the cultural fronts of the Russian spring.
Izborsky club. Russian strategies. Cultural
power of the Russian world, No. 5(41),
48-65. (In Russian)
Özpek, B. B. (2014). The Role of Democracy in
the Recognition of De Facto States: An
Empirical Assessment. Global Governance,
20(4) (Oct.-Dec.), 585-599.
Patriarch Kyryl. (2009). Speech by His Holiness
Patriarch Kyryl at the grand opening of the III
Assembly of the Russian World. Official
website of the Moscow Patriarchate.
http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/928446.ht
ml. (In Russian)
Pereslegin, S. (2003). Self-instruction manual for
playing on the “world chessboard”. Classics
of geopolitics, ХΙХ century. Moscow: AST,
697-700. (In Russian)
Pirchner, H. (2019). Post Putin: succession,
stability, and Russia's future. American
Foreign Policy Council: Rowman &
Littlefield publishers, 122 p.
Pocheptsov, G. (2018). Cognitive Attacks in
Russian Hybrid Warfare. Information &
Security: An International Journal, 41,
37-43. https://doi.org/10.11610/isij.4103
Poiarkova, T. (2022). “Others” in the Ukrainian
society as a result of the modern Russian-
Ukrainian war. in: European journal of
sustainable development, 11(1), 20-30.
https://doi.org/10.14207/ejsd.2022.v11n1p20
Putin, V. (2021). “Russians and Ukrainians are
one people. Together we are stronger and
more successful”. Fontanka.
https://www.fontanka.ru/2021/07/12/700210
85/ (In Russian)
Putin, V. (2022). About the situation in Ukraine.
https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2022/03/16/vlad
imir-putin-o-situacii-na-ukraine-polnyy-tekst
(In Russian)
Reich, W. (1980). The Mass Psychology of
Fascism. Editorial: Farrar, Straus and
Giroux. 395 p.
Sergunin, Al. (2004). Discussions of
international relations in post-communist
Russia. Communist and Post-Communist
Volume 12 - Issue 61
/ January 2023
79
http:// www.amazoniainvestiga.info ISSN 2322- 6307
Studies, 37(1), March, 19-35. doi:
10.1016/j.postcomstud.2003.12.007
Snyder, T. (2022). The war in Ukraine has
unleashed a new word. in: the New York
times magazine.
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/22/magaz
ine/ruscism-ukraine-russia-war.html
Tangi A., de. (2012). The Great Migration:
Russia and Russians after the Fall of the Iron
Curtain. Moscow: Russian Political
Encyclopedia (ROSSPEN). 479 p. (in
Russian)
Tilly, Ch. (1993). Coercion, Capital and
European States, A.D. 990-1990. Wiley-
Blackwell Paperback. 284 p.
Toffler, A. (1993). War and Anti-War: Survival
at the Dawn of the 21st Century. Little Brown
and Company, 302 p.
Toffler, A., & Toffler, H. (2006). Revolutionary
wealth how it will be created and how it will
change our lives. Curtis Brown Ltd. 490 p.
Van Creveld, M. (1991). Transformation of War.
New York: Free Press, 243 р.
Volkovskyi, V. (2021). Independence in
opposition to the “Russian world”: a
philosophical world. Philosophy of
Education, 27(1), 57-77.
https://doi.org/10.31874/2309-1606-2021-
27-1-4
Wallerstein, I. (1974). The modern world-
system. Vol. I: Capitalist agriculture andthe
origins of the European world-economy in
the sixteenth century. San Di-
ego: Academic Press, 440 p.
Wallerstein, I. (1991). Geopolitics and
geoculture: Essays on the changing world-
system. Cambridge, England: Cambridge
University Press, 252 p.
Zaporozhtseva, G. (2016). On the ways of
returning Ukraine to the bosom of the
Russian world. Izborsky club. Russian
strategies. Doctrine of the Russian world,
No. 6-7 (42-43), 120-127. (In Russian)